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At its sitting of 11 December 1989 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by 
Mr Siso Cruellas on the drawing up of an agreement on the reciprocal 
protection of investment between the European Community and the countries of 
Eastern Europe, pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure, to the 
Committee on External Economic Relations as the committee responsible and to 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy for its 
opinion. 
At its meeting of 30 May 1990 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
decided to draw up a report and appointed Mr Benoit rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 17 October 1990, 22 January 1992 and 22 April 1992 the 
committee considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting the Committee on External Economic Relations adopted the 
motion for a resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Stavrou and 
Juncker, vice-chairmen; Benoit, rapporteur; Chabert, Guillaume, 
Janssen van Raay (for Gallenzi), Marck (for Lemmer), Moorhouse, Peijs, Price, 
Rossetti and Suarez Gonzalez. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy decided 
on 18 April 1990 not to deliver an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 23 April 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on investments in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the guarantees 
for those investments 
The European Parliament, 
-having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Siso Cruellas on the 
drawing up of an agreement for the rec i proca 1 protection of investment 
between the European Community and the countries of Eastern Europe 
(83-0453/89}, 
- having regard to the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe since 
autumn 1989, 
- having regard to the rapid developments in the former USSR, particularly 
since summer 1991, 
- having regard to the EC investment programmes, PHARE, which are designed to 
aid the development process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
- having regard to the cooperation agreements concluded with Poland, Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, 
having regard to the growing array of economic and commercial links between 
the EEC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
- having regard to its many reports on all aspects of rapprochement between 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the EC, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
(A3-0162/92}, 
A. whereas these countries cannot improve their economic conditions unaided; 
B. noting the determination of Western countries to contribute to the 
development of Central and Eastern Europe, but also the inadequacy of the 
resources currently being marshalled for that purpose, 
C. recognizing the need for a financial impetus to foster the market economy 
in these countries, 
D. noting, also, that management and administrative practices and procedures 
in these countries hamper development, 
E. whereas these countries have a sizeable economic and human potential 
which should ultimately be turned into effective performance, 
F. recognizing the need for long-term aid designed to enable these countries 
gradually to take responsibility for their own development, 
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1. Takes the view that the Community should assist these countries in 
implementing an investment promotion and management policy, in close 
cooperation with the nation a 1 economic and other authorities, business 
representatives and G 24; 
2. Takes the view that - if they have not a 1 ready done so - a 11 Member 
States should conclude investment protection agreements with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in order to promote investments 
and guarantee their protection for the length of time agreed; 
3. Takes the view, likewise, that in order to simplify matters, investment 
protect ion agreements concluded by Member States with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe must as far as possible have the same content 
and, if possible, be based on a standard Community text; 
4. Takes the view that the Community should coordinate the work of 
institutions which guarantee or facilitate credit, such as COFACE in 
France, the Export Credit Guarantee Department in the United Kingdom, and 
the AKA in Germany; 
5. Proposes the establishment of an investment observatory which would have 
the task of proposing incentive, guarantee and protection mechanisms 
covering Community investment in third countries and, more particularly, 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and of analysing the inadequacies of their 
economic, judicial and tax systems where competition and the market 
economy are concerned; 
6. Takes the view that this observatory should be linked with the 
multilateral monitoring committee; 
7. Considers that this observatory should submit an annual report to 
Parliament's Committee on External Economic Relations on the 
implementation and progress of investment in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, which would be debated in Parliament; 
8. Calls, therefore, on the Commission, the Member States and all public or 
private bodies able to contribute, to develop networks for the exchange 
of legal, commercial, economic and fiscal information between the EEC and 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with a view to setting up a 
market economy; 
9. Calls for the BERD to be given a key role in implementing this policy, 
and urges it to adapt its operational and funding arrangements 
accordingly; 
10. Calls for closer cooperation among SMUs/SMis in the Community and between 
Community SMUs/SMis and their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe; 
11. Considers that this closer cooperation should be brought about by 
coordinating the work carried out by the investment observatory, and 
under the various Community initiatives, in particular EUROTECHNET, in an 
appropriate manner; 
DOC_EN\RR\207254 - 5 - PE 151.178/fin. 
12. Considers that the observatory should be able to draw on a network of 
correspondents in each of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the new republics of the former USSR; proposes the setting up of economic 
observatories and high-level research institutions specializing in the 
economic development and laws of the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, able to provide the Community institutions and economic operators 
with useful information on investment in these countries, thus 
encouraging the establishment of undertakings and investment in these 
countries; 
13. Urges that the aid to the various states and 
independent republics of the former USSR should 
fragmentation or dilution of investment detrimental 
interests of the EC and the recipient countries; 
the various newly-
not result in a 
to the co 11 ect i ve 
14. Takes the view that the successful implementation of an investment policy 
will make for economic development and political stability in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the former 
USSR; 
15. Takes the view that the G7 decisions will contribute to the success of an 
economic modernization policy in these countries, and hopes to see a 
significant increase in fi nanc i a 1 commitments by, the United States and 
Japan in relation to these countries; 
16. Considers that an investment policy can succeed only if the leaders and 
citizens of these countries make clear economic and legal choices and are 
able to marshal their efforts to put them into practice; 
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission and the Member States, and to the governments of the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
1. An initial frantic desire to invest in Eastern Europe 
This period of enthusiasm lasted about a year and coincided more or less with 
the year _1990. It followed the political changes which occurred in these 
countries during the autumn of 1989. The outward-1 ooki ng attitude of these 
countries is eas i 1 y understood. Lack of foreign exchange and a heavy debt 
burden, the need to modernize their economies by appealing for outside 
assistance and to integrate themselves into the world economic system by all 
possible means coincide with the desire of the current authorities to give 
pledges of their desire to introduce thorough economic reforms and implement 
them effectively. 
On the Western side, interest has been great for economic as much as political 
reasons. Investors who operate at an international level know that it is 
essential to be the first on the new market even if the profitability of that 
cooperation emerges only in the long or even very long term. 
There was therefore a certain degree of coincidence between commercial and 
political points of view on the Western side during the initial phase. 
2. A commitment soon to give way to disappointment and disillusion 
A turnround occurred as early as January 1991. 
Cases where investors are managing to establish themselves are not 
encouraging. The infrastructure must certainly be modernized or even 
completely revamped. Profitability, if any, will be a very long-term affair. 
Only investors who are able to wait quite a long time and invest enough can 
persist. The weakest are immediately excluded. All that remains are States, 
multinationals and certain very powerful national groups. There is thus a 
tendency for the potentia 1 flow of investment to the countries of Eastern 
Europe to be reduced to a relatively modest level, which in turn could hamper 
the efficacy of the reforms and of the efforts of the government authorities 
by being inadequate to meet their needs. 
PART ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 
I. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
1. Similarities 
The decision-making process is thus based on criteria which are administrative 
rather than economic. 
The economy is three-pronged: 
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(a) The centre, i.e. the politico-administrative machine as a whole which 
defines the strategy and more particularly, the allocation of investment by 
sector and the production levels desired. The maximalist principle: produce 
as much as possible with the available resources, leads to an emphasis on 
quantity rather than profitability. 
(b) The economic operators: undertakings (which produce) and managers 
(administrations which organize the activity of a sector or a branch and t~s 
control the undertakings). 
By negotiating with the centre, where the distribution of resources by sector 
is decided, they endeavour to obtain as much money as poss i b 1 e a11d seek to 
achieve the most spectacular results so as to justify their claims. There is 
thus a certain amount of competition, but between branches of activity taken 
as a whole, not between undertakings working in the same sector. This 
competition is therefore a factor of inefficiency wh i eh perverts the system 
rather than a regulatory factor. 
(c) The users: undertakings (when they buy), admi ni strati ons (when they 
buy) and consumers. 
Undertakings are in a position of strength when they are selling and of 
weakness when they are buying. Consumers depend on the goodwi 11 of the 
sellers. Schematically speaking, one may say that it is not the customer but 
the seller who is king. This is a very different position from that 
experienced by operators in a market economy. One can imagine the 
difficulties which partners used to a market economy and those used to a 
state economy encounter in adapting to each other. 
The mode of production is generally inefficient and productivity is falling. 
Productivity of labour apparently varies between 55% and 70% of the level in 
the West. Productivity of capital is apparently particularly bad. The 
maintenance at all costs of a high level of employment contributes to lowering 
production or at least to keeping it at a mediocre level. 
The resulting produce is impossible to sell on western markets. The lack of 
competition and therefore of innovation and selection by market forces leads 
to supply which is inadequate in both quantity and quality. 
The notion 'international system' as applied to the economy of these 
countries is very specific and differs fundamentally from that of the western 
world. 
New difficulties are arising as a result of the disappearance of COMECON, 
which had some merits: that of maintaining a market for these countries' 
manufactured products. It has even been claimed that the USSR paid higher 
prices than it should have done for manufactured products from these 
countries. Conversely, Eastern Europe obtained Soviet oi 1 at prices below 
world prices. The reduction in relations between the former COMECON countries 
to the lowest possible level led to a reduction in the sales of Soviet oil in 
1990 of 15 to 20% over 1989 and to a parallel drop in purchases of 
manufactured products from the countries of Eastern Europe. Thus the 
countries of Eastern Europe have simultaneously lost the possibility of 
providing their industries with cheap raw materials and energy and possible 
outlets for their products. The new operating rules presuppose that trade 
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will be carried out on the basis of world prices and payment in strong 
currencies. The cost of such a change will be high. 
A possible solution would be gradually to transform COMECON into a free trade 
area, but this solution, which presupposes that the USSR will be integrated 
into it, seems very unlikely in the new political climate. 
2. Differences between States 
{a) The GDR still exists, no longer as an official state, but as a 
geographical and human entity which is still distinct from the FRG. 
The luck of the former GDR is naturally to have the advantage of the German 
context into which it is now integrated. It is to be noted that foreign 
investors are often eliminated for the benefit of West German investors. The 
GDR remains a German matter which for the moment tends to be settled among 
Germans. 
{b) Certain countries have clearly opted for the western model, namely 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These countries are known to wish to 
become fully integrated into the West, which has led them openly to express 
the desire to join the EC. The courage shown by their political leaders and 
sacrifices which have been made to allow the necessary transition suggest that 
this transformation should succeed in the long term. 
{c) Two other countries seem to stick to their former positions: Bulgaria 
and Romania. There seems to be a very wide gap between political changes {or 
attempts at political change) and the economic situation, where thorough-going 
reforms are late arriving. 
(d) Two countries are breaking up without finding new models on which to 
rebuild: Albania (to a certain extent) and Yugoslavia. Political 
difficulties here have taken on such proportions that these countries are torn 
by centrifugal movements which place their very existence in danger: 
religious, ethnic, regional, and other conflicts. It is clear that the 
priorities, or even emergencies, cannot be compared with those of the other 
countries of Eastern Europe. 
(e) The USSR remains a world apart. It is obvious that its huge size alone 
di st i ngui shes it from the other countries of Eastern Europe. There are 
certainly enormous difficulties: an economy to be reconstructed, separatist 
movements wh i eh are causing the Union to break up, hesitations about the 
nature and scope of the political and economic reforms to be carried out. The 
1 i st is a 1 ong and fami 1 i ar one. On the other hand, it is a country with 
enormous natural resources, a large population which could very quickly be in 
a position to deve 1 op those resources, an immense potentia 1 market and the 
ability to achieve self-sufficiency which makes various solutions possible 
and, despite everything, there is the fact that the USSR remains an actor on 
the world political stage. 
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3. Difficulty of forming a true idea of these countries and of comparing 
their performance either with each other or with us by employing only our 
own assessment criteria 
In these countries in which prices were regulated, 'full employment 
guaranteed' and external trade strictly controlled, there are no statistics 
reflecting possible major economic imbalances. 
The earlier statistics from these countries over-estimated growth. The new 
ones have yet to take into account the new goods and services produced and it 
is, for the moment, almost impossible to get an idea of the real competitive 
position of undertakings. 
4. It is necessary to know the specific cyclic operation of these countries 
and to understand the resulting investment policy 
(a) The economy of the countries of Eastern Europe works 'on a four-phase 
cycle: 
Take-off: investment authorizations increase, building sites 
proliferate. Projects absorb only limited material and human resources in 
the initial phase. 
Acceleration: construction sites grow, investment expenditure 
accelerates and its share of national revenue increases. Shortages 
develop. The construction sites, which are too numerous and more costly 
than expected, start to 1 ack cement, stee 1, 1 abour, etc. The shortages 
reach consumer goods. Thus, the cement which is lacking on the 
construction sites is taken from the building of housing. Steel is 
withdrawn from branches of manufactured consumer goods (cars for example) 
and allocated as a matter of priority to engineering. 
Slow-down: the worsening of shortages and proliferation of unfinished 
construction sites induces the centre to reduce the level of new 
investment authorizations and to allocate resources as a priority to the 
completion of projects already commenced. 
Recession and recovery: in order to bring shortages back to their 
normal level, the Centre freezes all new investment and speeds up the 
bringing into service of outstanding projects. As new production 
capacity starts functioning, supplies improve and external trade picks 
up. Recovery gets under way when the centre can relaunch investment. 
(b) Morbid hunger for investment and over-investment 
The Centre's ambitions always exceed the real capacity of the economy. It is 
impossible for the central decision-makers to estimate in advance the scale of 
error. This is only known once the error has been committed. 
The struggle for access to resources requires excessive and scattered 
investment which is, therefore, inefficient. In addition, in order to obtain 
authorization to invest and an initial release of funds, applicants 
systematically understate the cost of their projects (often by 20-30%, but 
sometimes by 50% or more). The idea is that once construction sites are under 
way, they will have to be finished one day. This is indeed the case but the 
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time taken to complete them is often very long and they have sometimes lost 
their raison d'etre before they are completed. 
(c) Consequences for foreign investors 
It is necessary for investors to supervise the operation of construction sites 
at the closest possible level to that at which the work is actually done, in 
other words they need to have direct contacts with the undertakings where 
production is actually carried out. But investors are usually obliged to use 
other channe 1 s: the authorities in their own country, who in turn get in 
touch with the public administrations of the countries of Eastern Europe. It 
can be understood that these potential investors tend to give priority to 
contacts with the real decision-makers and to place their confidence in them 
rather than getting bogged down in technical considerations of the most 
trivial kind, which is normally the concern of the local authorities. 
PART TWO: INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
I. RELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY A COUNTRY AND PROMOTION OF INVESTOR 
COUNTRIES' EXPORTS 
1. Distinction between financing and investment 
Financing consists of using oneself or - more often - entrusting to an 
entrepreneur capital which is shared out among the various production factors. 
Theoretically, the main value of an investment in the form of financial 
capita 1 1 i es in the fl exi bi 1 i ty of its use and the poss i bi 1 i ty of measuring 
the profitability of the use of the capital. This type of investment is that 
made by bankers, who are investors par excellence. 
Investments frequently take another form, namely in training and supplies of 
machines or technology as such. The entrepreneur then receives the staff to 
provide the training or the desired equipment. This practice is carried out 
in particular if the country benefiting from the investment is not in a 
position to provide the services itself and if it becomes advantageous to 
supply it to them directly. It is also the case when an investor is an 
entrepreneur who has men or equipment wh i eh he wishes to see used by his 
partners or subcontractors. 
2. Description of investment - export interaction 
It is useful to take a look at the organic link which exists between these two 
notions. The country which wishes to sell its production to another must 
naturally produce sellable goods and services of a nature and quality 
acceptable to a potential buyer, but this is only one facet of trade. The 
buyer country must have the necessary foreign exchange to pay for the 
products or at 1 east be in a position to exchange them for other products 
which must also be of a type and quality desirable on the external market to 
potential buyers. Experience shows that a well-conducted investment policy is 
nearly always profitable in the long term. 
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II. HOW TO INVEST IN THESE COUNTRIES 
1. Investors' margin for manoeuvre 
These countries need capital, especially foreign exchange, but for most of the 
time this is not the most important thing. Above all they need new 
technologies, or at least those on a par with ours, and training for 
management, trade and in general to learn everything to do with western-style 
economic relations. 
They are therefore obliged to accept the presence of many foreigners and to 
open their borders to our products. Any attempt to return to their old ways 
condemns them in advance to stagnation or regression. Internal political 
developments might of course lead to such behaviour. One might imagine 
certain countries choosing poverty or economic regression in order to keep 
their independence or out of an attachment to ideological concepts. 
2 . There is sometimes a wide gap between the priorities desired by these 
countries and those sectors in which the Western world can act. 
Reciprocal interests do not necessarily coincide. The countries of Eastern 
Europe wish to succeed in developing their natural resources on a vast scale 
and on a long-term basis and Western undertakings are looking for quick 
profitability in high-performance sectors. The notion of comp 1 ementarity of 
economies is not clear. The undertakings of Eastern Europe can often hope to 
be little more than subcontractors, which places them entirely in the hands 
of Western undertakings. 
The priority 
out-of-date 
cooperating. 
several rival 
and potentia 1 
traditionally given to heavy industries which the West considers 
and unprofitable is another example of the difficulty of 
The divergence of interests is increased by the existence of 
countries in Eastern Europe as regards demand for investment 
rivals as regards products to be sold. 
3. The EBRD is operational but its resources are very limited and its 
procedures remain to be determined. 
The ECU 1 bn it has available amounts to very little when it comes to sharing 
it out among the various countries. So each project is the subject of 
increasingly severe conditions. This institution can therefore for the moment 
only provide top-up aid. 
4. The same applies to the EIB, which can only play a marginal, though 
useful, role. 
5. The PHARE programme is the channel through which western investments are 
more or less obliged to pass. 
The PHARE programme is a channel which meets the needs but it maintains and 
even increases the government-to-government nature of the relations. 
The result is an undeniable lack of flexibility, but this practice has the 
merit of taking place in a clearly defined official institutional framework, 
in theory adapted to current conditions. One of its major disadvantages is 
that it automatically excludes potential small investors to the benefit of 
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those whose power enables them to have high-level discussions with national 
leaders. 
6. Principal objectives and areas covered by the PHARE programme: reminder 
of the principal projects 
(The 1990 budget provided ECU 500 m in direct aid, the 1991 budget ECU 820 m). 
two multidisciplinary technical assistance programmes (ECU 10 m) for 
professional training and the promotion of trade and investment in Central 
and Eastern Europe; 
the implementation of the programme of trans-European mobility for higher 
education - Tempus (ECU 25 m) to modernize higher education, improve 
vocational training and foster contacts with Community institutions with 
the same aim: beneficiaries GDR, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
These countries benefit from 'personalized' aid in the following sectors: 
imports of plant protection products; 
environmental protection; 
basic technical assistance for the Privatization Agencies; 
sectoral programmes of food imports for animals and food additives for 
animals; 
sectoral programmes of imports and technical assistance for SMUs; 
imports of equipment for agriculture and the agri-food industry. 
In general, it can be seen that the programmes concern very specific sectors 
which are part of the administrative field rather than direct investment in 
undertakings. 
III. HOW CAN INVESTMENT IN THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE BE PROMOTED AND 
PROTECTED? PLAN PUT FORWARD BY THE COMMISSION1 
1. Investment flows must be considerably increased in a direct form so as to 
slow down the increase in the debt of the countries concerned and to 
familiarize them with the possibilities of the private sector. 
2. The network of investment protection agreements between the Member States 
and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is incomplete and must be 
completed as soon as possible. 
The Community credit insurance market is partitioned. Agencies in each Member 
State can provide cover only for enterprises established in that Member State. 
Coordination between national agencies providing export credit insurance is 
extremely limited. This increases the price and reduces the availability of 
cover for exporters and thus distorts competition. In many cases po 1 it i ea 1 
and economic risks are judged too great, especially by smaller firms, and 
potentially profitable business opportunities are missed. 
I See SEC (90) 2123 final 
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3. Particular efforts must be made to promote guarantees and credit insurance 
systems. 
Extend insurance cover to increase the possibilities of financing exports 
to these countries; 
Improve the assessment of not only political but also commercial risks, 
in particular those arising from current reforms; 
Facilitate industrial cooperation in the Community, in particular to 
preserve the competitive position of Community exporters; 
Bring the risk cover policies of credit insurance agencies closer 
together, to reduce the handicaps of exporters where the po 1 icy is more 
restrictive. 
4. Joint ventures should play a major role under the PHARE programme. 
to identify new projects and potential new partners; 
to take steps to set up other joint ventures; 
to provide a solution to capital requirements; 
to provide technical assistance where necessary to other joint ventures. 
5. Financial services should be strengthened in countries where Community 
undertakings are established. 
Community 
insurance 
capital. 
aid should concentrate on the 
services and the development 
creation of banking and credit 
of securities markets to raise 
6. The legal framework for investment must be more clearly and fully defined 
in the countries concerned. 
An end must be put to the vagueness surrounding company law, tax legislation, 
profit taxes, property rights, etc. in these countries, which is particularly 
great at a time when reforms are under way but where implementation is still 
incomplete. 
7. Information on business opportunities in these countries must be improved: 
extension of the staff and functions of the Commission's information 
offices in these countries 
Fairs, exhibitions, data banks, activities 
undertakings should be made available by 
particular offici a 1 channe 1 s represented by 
activities should perhaps be reconsidered and 
8. Develop subcontracting 
0 
0 0 
DOC_EN\RR\207254 
- 14 -
of chambers of commerce and 
all possible channels and in 
our information offices, whose 
adapted to the host countries. 
PE 151.178/fin. 
In the interests of brevity, we shall not describe the methods generally used 
to guarantee the financing of international investments. 
IV. CERTAIN PROBLEMS ARE STILL UNSOLVED 
These are either difficulties which have not yet arisen in practice or matters 
for which legislation must be finalized. Here are some examples: 
1. Reciprocity of treatment for undertakings, in particular joint 
undertakings, established in the countries of Eastern Europe and the EC as 
regards investment opportunities, taxation, repatriation of profits, etc; 
2. The settlement of disputes between undertakings, between undertakings and 
the authorities of the host countries, etc.; 
3. The assessment and payment of any damages and interest arising as the 
result of a dispute; 
4. The different treatment to be given where appropriate to partners 
according to their size: multinationals, large national groups, SMUs or 
SMis. Generally speaking, SMUs need guarantees and protection. legally 
speaking they are poorly placed to cope with the unknown situations which 
they encounter in foreign countries and hesitate to invest. 
Multinationals on the other hand sometimes encroach and one needs to be 
forearmed against abuse of dominant positions. They must be protected but 
others must also be protected against them; 
5. Reversion to the previous situation remains theoretically possible: 
renationalization, return to a state economy, etc. Then what would 
happen to foreign investment in these countries? In fact the 
practicalities of doing without foreign investment would probably 
determine the so 1 uti on adopted by the States concerned. The growing 
interdependence of the countries of the whole world should lead to 
relatively flexible solutions. 
V. WHAT THE TECHNIQUES AT THE INVESTORS' DISPOSAL SHOULD MAKE POSSIBLE 
1. Avoid casting the net too wide 
This serves no useful purpose. 
in which sector of activity in 
profitable for the investor 
investment is made. 
It is necessary to determine in which country, 
that country, and at what level investment is 
and useful for the country in which the 
2. Protect both public and private investment 
The safest technique seems to be to create a mutual guarantee fund supplied by 
the Community budget and open as a priority to undertakings specializing in 
activities which yield a quick return on investment. 
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3. Determine the eligibility threshold of projects 
In other words, investors' plans should be studied and monitored by officials 
of an economic 'observatory' specialized in the analysis of the economic 
activities of the countries of Centra 1 and Eastern Europe. This means that 
the guarantee fund should be accompanied by a market survey fund to be carried 
out before investment actually takes place. 
4. Obtain an increase in capital at Community level with a view to ensuring a 
greater flow of investment to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
(a) Obtain an increased capital endowment for organizations such as the EBRD; 
(b) Increase the financial resources available from public funds in the 
banking sector; 
(c) Set up a programme such as PHARE. 
5. An illusion which must not be encouraged 
For private investors, investment goes hand-in-hand with risk. Business can 
never be risk-free. There can be no question of using public funds to 
guarantee risks inherent in bad business deals, bad management or bad 
commercial policy. Protection of investors can only be relative. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Investing 
uncertain. 
1 aws and 
upheavals 
in the countries of Eastern Europe remains difficult and 
Their precarious economic conditions, the vagueness of their 
the social and institutional insecurity ar1s1ng from the 
experienced by these countries are all obstacles; 
2. Investing in a balanced manner is no less difficult. Effective account 
must be taken of the mutual interests of partners who appear very 
different as regards both their financial or technical means and their 
social structures and needs; 
3. There exists the potential danger of colonial-type relations growing up 
between the highly industrialized countries and poor countries ready to 
accept unequal conditions of trade in order to ensure their survival. We 
have known since 1960 that such relations are not only bad in themselves 
but that the victims do not succeed in getting out of the system thus set 
up. We must therefore avoid going into it; 
4. The most satisfactory solution presupposes even greater integration of the 
whole of the European continent into a continental whole with a central 
pivot represented by the EC and involving all the countries of EFTA and 
all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in balanced political, 
economic and institutional conditions; 
5. Finally, we may suggest the setting up of an 'agency for development and 
investment in these countries' as an integral part of Community 
organization and action by the Member States, which will be able to act in 
the light of the real situation in these countries without adding to local 
bureaucracy. 
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Annex I 
Main sections of activity on which western investors should concentrate by 
country 
Investment in these sectors should be the most profitable and lead to 
investment in other sectors. 
I. USSR 
I I. GDR 
Ill. Hungary 
IV. Czechoslovakia 
V. Romania 
VI. Bulgaria 
VI I. Yugoslavia 
VIII. Albania 
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agri-food industry 
transport 
energy 
telecommunications 
heavy industry exploiting coal, natural 
gas, copper, lignite and silver 
production of capital goods and semi-
finished products 
diversified consumer goods, in particular 
motor cars 
nothing very obvious despite substantial 
success in certain sectors: glass, 
ceramics, porce 1 a in, wood, paper, paper 
pulp and printing 
an economy whi eh is too chaotic for the 
moment but wh i eh has possibilities for 
tourism, in particular winter tourism 
Mediterranean-style tourism 
the political situation 
plans for the moment 
transport infrastructure 
ports) is a natura 1 
investment 
oil and tourism 
prohibits any 
(rail, roads, 
sector for EC 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (83-0453/89) 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr SISO CRUELLAS 
Annex II 
on the drawing up of an agreement for the reciprocal protection of investment 
between the European Community and the countries of Eastern Europe 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas the Member States of the European Community must help to 
consolidate the moves being made towards democracy in Eastern Europe, 
B. whereas this kind of support must help, essentially, to consolidate new 
financial structures which will strengthen the economies of the Eastern 
European countries, 
C. \\hereas for this reason it is essential to set up mechanisms for the 
reci proca 1 protection of investments, in order to guarantee that the 
economic entities of the Member States contribute, by their investments, 
to the social and economic changes in the countries of Eastern Europe. 
1. Calls for an agreement to be drawn up between the European Community and 
the State-trading countries ensuring the reciprocal protection of 
investments; 
2. Urges that this agreement should provide an adequate framework to 
safeguard the investments of Community businesses in Eastern Europe; 
3. Recommends that this agreement should be ratified by the parliaments of 
the countries signing the agreement; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the 
Commission of the European Communities. 
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